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of	what	 determines	 these	 spillovers	 in	 abstract,	 but	 they	 also	want	 to	 apply	 their	
framework	to	the	Euro	Area.	After	showing	that	spillovers	from	a	fiscal	expansion	in	
the	core	 to	the	periphery	will	be	 larger	 if	 there	 is	a	 longer‐lasting	 liquidity	 trap,	 if	






Before	 thinking	about	what	 to	make	of	 their	points,	 it	 helps	 to	 fix	 ideas	by	
asking	 to	which	 two	actual	 euro	area	 regions	 their	model	might	 apply.	The	 “core”	
country	 in	 their	model	 has	 no	 fiscal	 constraint	 that	 prevents	 it	 from	 exogenously	
choosing	to	increase	public	spending.	It	can	finance	this	expansion	by	issuing	public	
debt,	 and	 this	 comes	with	no	 increase	 in	 the	 interest	 rate	 it	 pays	on	 its	 sovereign	
debt.	Moreover,	 it	 is	 large	 enough	 that	 this	 extra	 spending	will	make	a	 significant	
material	 difference	 in	 the	 exports	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 Euro	 area.	 In	 turn,	 the	
“periphery”	 country	 is	 smaller,	 but	 not	 infinitesimal	 as	 in	 small	 open	 economy	
models,	since	its	actions	have	an	effect	on	the	exchange	rate	and	on	the	net	exports	
of	the	larger	core	economy.	It	has	a	similar	structure	as	the	core	country,	with	the	




	 From	 this	 description,	 it	 seems	 adequate	 to	 equate	 the	 core	 economy	with	
Germany	 in	 Europe.	 In	 turn,	 the	 periphery	 country	 is	 probably	 best	 captured	 by	
Italy,	or	maybe	even	perhaps	France.	This	 is	not	a	model	 that	applies	easily	 to	 the	










of	 refugees	 into	 the	 country	 coming	 from	 the	 Middle	 East	 and	 Northern	 Africa	
dominated	the	headlines.	There	is	a	variety	of	public	spending	programs	needed	to	
process	 these	new	 immigrants	and	provide	 them	with	basic	 social	 services,	which	
across	the	EU	could	be	as	large	as	40	billion	euros	(Corsetti	et,	al,	2016).	While	this	
is	 not	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 authors	 frame	 the	 contribution	 of	 their	 paper,	 their	
analysis	and	results	can	be	used	to	answer	a	precise	question:	will	 the	 increase	 in	
public	 spending	 in	 Germany	 to	 receive	 the	 refugees	 benefit	 the	 Italian	 or	 French	
economies?	
	
The	authors	 isolate	 the	 theoretical	 channels	 that	will	affect	 the	response	 to	




difficulties	 with	 interpreting	 fiscal	 multipliers.	 Third,	 I	 try	 to	 complement	 the	
authors’	 analysis	 that	 focuses	 on	 traditional	 new	 Keynesian	 channels	 with	 the	
modern	 view	 of	 the	 eurocrisis,	 and	 how	 they	 may	 interact	 with	 fiscal	 spending.	
Finally,	 I	conclude	by	asking	whether	the	authors’	contribution	and	arguments	are	


























real	 returns	 will	 be	 lower	 in	 the	 periphery.	 This	 leads	 to	 higher	 current	
consumption,	and	so	output.	
	
	 Whatever	makes	 these	 three	 effects	 stronger	will	 boost	 the	 impact	 of	 core	
fiscal	spending	on	periphery’s	output.	The	authors	therefore	focus	on	four	factors	on	
which	 the	 fiscal	 spillover	will	depend.	First,	 the	 longer	 is	 the	expected	duration	of	
the	 liquidity	 trap	 then	 nominal	 interest	will	 stay	 fixed	 for	 longer,	 so	 the	 effect	 of	
inflation	on	long	real	interests	is	larger.	For	their	baseline	results,	countries	are	in	a		



























on	 them	 and	 emphasize	 them.	 One	 could	 easily	 list	 many	 more	 that	 might	 be	
considered,	but	it	is	much	harder	to	argue	that	any	of	them	are	as	important	as	the	
ones	 considered	by	 the	authors.	Still,	 two	of	 them	stand	out,	 in	my	view,	as	being	
potentially	as	important,	and	so	are	worth	mentioning.	
	






plausibly	 likewise	have	a	significant	“leakage”	 in	 its	aggregate	demand	stimulus	to	
outside	the	euro	area,	reducing	some	of	the	authors’	estimates.	
	
	 The	 second	 absent	 channel	works	 through	nominal	wage	 rigidities.	 In	 new	
Keynesian	models,	 wage	 rigidities	 have	 a	 large	 effect	 on	 how	much	 the	 domestic	
economy	expands	after	a	fiscal	stimulus	as	well	as	on	the	international	transmission	














to	confront	the	data.	Starting	with	∆G,	this	 is	 typically	quite	small	 in	XXIst	century	
stimulus	 programs.	 In	 the	 days	 of	 Keynes,	 the	 bulk	 of	 government	 spending	 in	
developed	countries	went	indeed	to	purchases	of	goods,	for	either	military	purposes	





	 As	 a	 result,	 when	 one	 looks	 at	 the	 breakdown	 of	 actual	 fiscal	 stimulus	
programs,	it	jumps	to	the	eye	that	most	of	them	consisted	in	increases	in	transfers.	
Between	2007	and	2009,	government	spending	shot	up	by	14%	in	the	United	States.	
Three	 quarters	 of	 this	 increase	 was	 on	 transfers.	 	 Looking	 at	 the	 increase	 in	
spending	 across	21	OECD	 countries	during	 this	 period,	Oh	 and	Reis	 (2012)	 found	









it	 hard	 to	 relate	 these	multipliers	 to	 the	data.	A	 few	examples	make	 this	 problem	
concrete.	 First,	 the	 authors	 assume	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 government	 purchases	 is	
paid	 off	 over	 time	 either	 using	 lump‐sum	 taxes	 (in	 their	 simple	 model)	 or	 labor	
income	taxes	 (in	 their	 larger	model).	But,	 in	 this	class	of	models,	 if	 instead	capital	
	 5
income	taxes,	or	consumption	taxes	were	used,	the	multipliers	can	be	quite	different	
(Drautzburg	 and	 Uhlig,	 2015).	 Since	 actual	 fiscal	 stimulus	 packages	 rarely	 clearly	
specify	how	will	the	deficits	be	paid	for	in	the	future,	this	makes	it	hard	to	estimate	
their	 effect.	 Second,	 the	 time	 profile	 of	 taxes	 is	 likewise	 important	 by	 affecting	
intertemporal	relative	prices,	and	it	is	especially	important	whether	the	higher	taxes	
come	before	or	after	the	economy	leaves	the	zero	lower	bound	(Correia	et	al,	2013).	
Slight	 changes	 in	 the	 time	 profile	 of	 taxes	 can	 easily	 turn	 an	 expansionary	 fiscal	
stimulus	 into	 a	 contractionary	 policy.	 Third,	 what	 people	 know	 and	 don’t	 know	
about	the	future	size	and	duration	of	the	expansion	in	purchases	and	the	taxes	that	
pay	 for	 it,	 likewise	will	 affect	 their	 response	 to	 the	 stimulus	 (Leeper	 et	 al,	 2013).	
Again,	measuring	agents’	expectations	following	a	stimulus	 is	a	daunting	empirical	
task	after	the	fact,	let	alone	when	the	policy	is	being	discussed.	Fourth,	increases	in	
purchases	and	 their	effect	on	real	activity	will	affect	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	 fiscal	
automatic	 stabilizers	 act	 in	 the	 economy	 as	 well	 as	 their	 overall	 effectiveness	
(McKay	and	Reis,	2016).	
	
		 The	“all	else	 fixed”	problem	with	this	partial	derivative	also	applies	 to	non‐




the	marginal	utility	of	consumption	 in	response	to	a	 the	stimulus.	But,	 if	 there	are	
complementarities	 instead,	 the	 fiscal	 expansion	 will	 raise	 this	 marginal	 utility.	
Because	 the	 zero	 lower	 bound	 equilibrium	 is	 characterized	 by	 having	 too	 low	
marginal	utility	of	consumption	in	the	present	relative	to	the	future,	due	to	too	high	
real	 interest	 rates,	 this	 provides	 another	 channel	 for	 the	 effectiveness	 of	
government	purchases.	
	
	 None	 of	 these	 caveats	 point	 to	 the	 authors’	 estimates	 being	 either	 clearly	
under	estimated	or	over	estimated.	Moreover,	most	of	 them	apply	as	much	to	this	
paper	 as	 they	 do	 to	 the	 large	 literature	 that	 in	 the	 last	 few	 years	 has	 estimate	
purchases	multipliers.	But	they	are	still	worth	stating,	and	repeating	many	times,	as	
so	 much	 research	 energy	 has	 been	 spent	 measuring	 a	 multiplier	 that	 is	 hard	 to	






	 This	 paper	 uses	 models	 and	 tools	 from	 the	 conventional	 macroeconomics	







	 The	 first	 important	 consideration	 is	 the	 spread	between	 sovereign	 interest	
rates	in	Germany	vis‐à‐vis	France	or	Italy.	The	sovereign	debt	crisis	in	the	periphery	
countries	 started	 with	 spikes	 in	 their	 sovereign	 interest	 rate	 spreads.	 Given	 the	
common	monetary	 policy,	 and	 so	 common	 exchange‐rate	 risk,	 the	 spreads	 reflect	




	 We	 can	 think	 of	 the	 expansion	 in	 the	 core	 as	 having	 two	 effects	 on	 the	
chances	 of	 a	 default	 in	 the	 periphery.	 First,	 by	 raising	 domestic	 output	 in	 the	
periphery,	 through	 the	 channels	 identified	 by	 the	 authors,	 the	 fiscal	 expansion	
lowers	the	benefits	of	defaulting.	Second,	by	lowering	the	core	real	interest	rate,	 it	
increases	 the	 supply	 of	 capital	 and	 lowers	 the	 cost	 of	 repaying	 the	 debt.	 Both	 of	
these	effects	 increase	the	 incentives	to	repay	the	debt	to	 foreign,	and	so	 lower	the	
risk	premia.	A	countervailing	effect	would	be	that	if	the	expansion	increases	the	risk	
that	 the	 core	 cannot	 repay	 its	 debt,	 it	 may	 raise	 its	 risk	 of	 default,	 thus	 raising	





	 A	 second	 consideration	 to	 have	 is	 on	 the	 role	 of	 capital	misallocation.	 The	
Italian	economy	stopped	growing	well	before	the	crisis	of	the	last	few	years:	Italian	






	 The	 evidence	 for	 several	 countries	 points	 to	misallocation	 of	 the	 abundant	
capital	flows	from	the	core	to	the	periphery	as	a	likely	culprit	for	this	slump	(Reis,	
2013).	In	Italy,	the	non‐tradables	sector	grew	at	the	expense	of	tradables	(Benigno	
and	 Fornaro,	 2016).	 In	 Portugal,	 within	 nontradables,	 it	 was	 the	 least	 productive	
and	 competitive	 sectors	 that	 absorbed	more	 of	 the	 capital	 flows	 and	 grew	 faster	
(Reis,	 2013).	 In	 Spain,	 even	within	 tradable	manufacturing	 the	 dispersion	 of	 firm	
productivity	increased,	as	smaller	and	less	productive	firms	being	kept	afloat	by	the	





exports	 to	 the	 core.	 Since	more	productive	 firms	 tend	 to	 export	more,	 this	would	




	 Third,	 the	 crisis	 has	 shown	 the	 importance	 of	 modern	 banks	 for	 the	
transmission	 of	macroeconomic	 shocks,	 and	 the	 need	 for	 economies	 to	 have	 safe	
assets.	 A	 fiscal	 expansion	 in	 the	 core	 that	 is	 funded	by	deficits,	 increases	 the	 safe	
core	public	debt,	alleviating	some	of	the	safe	asset	shortage	(Caballero	et	al,	2016).	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 increasing	 the	 supply	of	 national	 bonds	when	 there	 is	no	 euro‐
wide	bond	may	accentuate	 the	diabolic	 loop	between	banks	and	sovereigns	at	 the	






	 This	 paper	makes	 a	 useful	 contribution	 to	 a	 relevant	 and	 important	 policy	
question	today:	would	a	fiscal	expansion	in	Germany	stimulate	economic	activity	in	
welfare	 not	 just	 in	 Germany	 but	 in	 France	 and	 Italy	 as	well?	 The	 authors	 isolate	
three	important	features	of	these	economies	on	which	the	answer	will	depend:	the	
import	 content	 of	 government	 purchases,	 the	 slope	 of	 the	 Phillips	 curve,	 and	 the	




	 In	 these	 comments,	 I	 added	 three	 further	 considerations.	 Two	 other	
important	 factors	 on	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 fiscal	 stimulus	 are	 the	 spillover	 of	 trade	
with	other	countries	outside	the	Eurozone	and	the	role	of	nominal	wage	rigidity	on	
the	slope	of	the	Phillips	curve.	Second,	I	criticized	the	focus	on	purchases	multipliers	
because	 actual	 changes	 in	 government	 purchases	 are	 usually	 small,	 and	 the	
estimation	of	multipliers	is	fraught	with	obstacles.	Third,	I	speculated	on	the	effects	
of	 a	 fiscal	 stimulus	 on	 the	 risk	 premium	 on	 sovereign	 bonds,	 on	misallocation	 of	
capital	 in	 the	periphery,	and	on	 the	supply	of	 safe	assets	and	 the	balance	sheet	of	
banks.	While	my	hope	is	that	these	add	to	the	understanding	of	the	question	posed	
by	 the	 authors,	 they	 do	 not	 detract	 from	 the	 relevance	 and	 significance	 of	 their	
contribution.	
	
A	 harder	 question	 is	whether	 a	 core	 country	would	 be	 convinced	by	 these	
arguments.	 On	 the	 positive	 side,	 this	 paper	 comes	 at	 the	 right	 time.	 In	 2010‐12,	
many	commentators	on	the	American	side	of	the	Atlantic	frequently	tried	to	make	a	











transfer	 across	 states,	 is	 almost	 politically	 impossible	 to	 entertain	 in	 Europe.	
Second,	 the	 countries	 going	 through	 a	 sovereign	debt	 crisis,	 like	Portugal,	 Greece,	
Ireland,	 Italy	 and	Spain	were	not	 at	 the	 zero	 lower	bound.	 In	 fact,	 during	 the	 two	
years	 of	 the	 crisis,	 even	 vague	 news	 that	 public	 spending	 would	 be	 higher	 than	
expected	would	lead	to	large	run‐ups	in	interest	rates,	so	the	extent	of	crowding	out	
was	very	 large.	Third,	 from	the	perspective	of	 the	core,	 the	German	economy	was	
booming	 during	 these	 years,	 so	 expansionary	 fiscal	 policy	 would	 have	 been	
procyclical.	 As	 much	 as	 American	 commentators	 were	 frustrated	 by	 how	 little	
influence	 their	 arguments	 had,	 European	 commentators	 were	 dismayed	 by	 how	
little	relevant	they	were	for	the	European	situation.	
	
In	 2016,	making	 the	 case	 for	 fiscal	 expansion	makes	more	 sense.	 Germany	
and	most	 of	 the	 euro	 area	 seem	 to	 satisfy	 now	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	 zero	 lower	
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